Prices versus policy:an analysis of the drivers of the primary fossil fuel mix by Atalla, Tarek et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Prices versus policy: An analysis of the drivers of the primary fossil fuel mix
Tarek Atallaa, Jorge Blazqueza, Lester C. Hunta,b,⁎, Baltasar Manzanoa,c
a King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center (KAPSARC), Saudi Arabia
b Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), University of Surrey, UK
c Universidade de Vigo, Spain
A R T I C L E I N F O
JEL Classiﬁcation:
C68
E30
E37
Q43
Q48
Keywords:
Energy transition
Fossil fuel mix
Relative prices
DSGE modeling
Prices vs policy
A B S T R A C T
Energy policymakers often attempt to shape their countries' energy mix, rather than leave it purely to market
forces. By calibrating and simulating a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, this paper
analyzes the primary fossil fuel mix in the USA and compares it to Germany and the UK, given the diﬀerent
evolution of the mixes and the diﬀerent roles played by relative prices and policy in North America and Europe.
It is found that the model explains well the evolution of the primary fossil fuel mix in the USA for the period
1980–2014, suggesting that relative fossil fuel prices generally dominated in determining the mix during this
time. However, this is not the case for Germany and the UK. For both countries, the model performs well only
for the period after the market-oriented reforms in the 1990s. Additionally, the volatility of private consumption
and output for the pre- and post-reform periods is evaluated for Germany and the UK and it is found that the
liberalized energy markets brought about a transition from coal to natural gas, but with increased
macroeconomic volatility.
1. Introduction
Policy makers see fuel price volatility as a risk to their economies.
Consequently, they often attempt to use energy policies to shape an
energy mix that leaves their economies less vulnerable to energy price
shocks. Environmental concerns also add pressure in favor of a
‘cleaner’ energy mix. Accordingly, the observed energy mix is generally
the result of the interaction of fuel prices, available technologies, and
energy policies. In other words, the energy mix is determined by the
relative costs of fuels, but also by local policies that address security,
environmental, economic, and social aspects of the energy system. This
paper aims to explain the role of fossil fuel prices relative to energy
policy in driving the primary fossil fuel mix.
Fig. 1 illustrates the evolving primary fossil fuel shares for the USA,
Germany, and the UK1 from 1980 to 2014 and shows that the fossil fuel
mix in the two European countries has changed far more than in the
USA. From the beginning to the end of the period, the USA's oil share
fell slightly from 46% to 42%, while the gas share increased from 30%
to 34% and the coal share hardly changed (although it did increase
slightly and then fall back again at the end of the period). In Germany,
although the oil share did not change dramatically from the beginning
to the end of the period (from 43% to 45%), the gas and coal shares did
– from 15% to 25% and from 41% to 30%, respectively. A similar
pattern emerged in the UK, with the oil, gas, and coal shares changing
over the period from 42% to 43%, from 21% to 38%, and from 37% to
17%, respectively.
Generally, the USA had a relatively stable primary fossil fuel mix
over the period 1980–2014, although there was an increase in the
share of gas and a fall in the share of coal towards the end of the period
(Fig. 1). This, by all accounts, was due to the development of shale gas
in the USA; according to Joskow (2015), the share of shale gas in USA
gas production increased from 7% in 2007 to 40% in 2015. In contrast,
the primary fossil fuel mixes in Germany and the UK gradually shifted
toward natural gas over the whole period, although from about 2010
onwards, it appears to decrease.
Therefore, it is interesting to analyze why the primary fossil fuel mix
evolved so diﬀerently in the USA compared to Germany and the UK
and to assess the factors behind the diﬀerence. In particular, are the
diﬀerences the result of market forces and, hence, chieﬂy driven by
relative fossil fuel prices? Alternatively, are the diﬀerences the result of
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the various energy policies of the countries considered in the analysis?2
It is also interesting to analyze the impact of the changing primary
fossil fuel mix on the two European countries' economies. In particular,
are the German and British economies more or less volatile after the
energy reforms of the 1980s and 1990s?
The analysis is undertaken by developing a Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model for the USA and then simulating the model to
assess the impact of relative prices on the primary fossil fuel mix over the
period 1980–2014.3 As a ﬁrst step, we analyze the stability of the calibrated
energy related parameters for the USA and compare them to those from
similar production functions for Germany and the UK, where policy
intervention is believed to have had a greater impact on primary fossil fuel
demand. Furthermore, the DSGE models for all three countries are
simulated in order to assess the importance of relative prices and policy
in driving the primary fossil fuel mix. Additionally, the DSGEmodel is used
to analyze the volatility of private consumption and output for the pre- and
post-reform periods in Germany and the UK to assess the impact of the
reforms on these economies.
Calibrated dynamic, either stochastic or deterministic, general equili-
brium models have been at the core of macroeconomic analysis for the last
few decades. Regarding energy, these models have mainly been used to
analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects of energy price shocks, particularly oil
shocks (such as, Kim and Loungani (1992), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1996)). More recently, DSGE models have been used to analyze optimal
energy taxation (De Miguel and Manzano, 2006; Golosov et al., 2014), the
behavior of the oil market (Nakov and Nuño, 2013), and the macroeco-
nomic impact of the shale oil revolution (Mănescu and Nuño, 2015).
However, a DSGE model is used here for a diﬀerent purpose. After
initially analyzing the eﬀects of fossil fuel prices and energy policies on the
changes in the primary fossil fuel mix in the US, Germany, and the UK, we
study the impact of the changing mix on the economic volatility of the two
European countries.4 Although some previous research has considered the
energy mix (such as Dassisti and Carnimeo (2012) for Europe; Carraro
et al. (2014) for the European power sector; Vidal-Amaro et al. (2015) for
the Mexican power sector), this is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst attempt to
analyze the drivers of the primary fossil fuel mix in this way. Moreover, the
literature on analyzing the impact of fuel price shocks has focused on the
impact of oil prices on economic activity (see for example, Hamilton (1983,
2003), Kilian (2008, 2009), DeMiguel et al. (2003), Kesicki (2010), Herrera
et al. (2015)). As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst attempt to analyze the
impact of fossil fuel prices on the fossil fuel mix and the consequences for
the economy.
In summary, this paper uses a macroeconomic approach to assess
the relative importance of fossil fuel prices and policy in determining
the primary fossil fuel mix. This is undertaken initially for the USA, and
then Germany and the UK where, a-priori, we expect policy to play a
greater role than prices given the diﬀerent energy policies in the USA
and the European countries. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 presents the DSGE model followed by Section 3 that
discusses the calibration of the model parameters and the simulation of
the model for the USA. Section 4 presents the calibration of the
parameters and simulation of the model for Germany and the UK,
compares them to those for the USA, and considers the impact of the
change in the fossil fuel mix on the volatility of private consumption
and output. Section 5 presents a summary and conclusion.
2. The model
The economies of the USA, Germany, and the UK can each be
represented by a stylized DSGE model. The models consist of an
inﬁnitely lived representative household and a representative ﬁrm
producing ﬁnal output. Given that the analysis aims to assess the
eﬀect of fossil fuel prices (relative to policy) on the primary fossil fuel
mix, not the determination of prices, fossil fuel prices are assumed
exogenous and stochastic.
2.1. The representative household
The representative household's preferences are characterized by a
utility function:
U c c
σ
( ) =
1−t
t
σ1−
(1)
where ct is consumption at time t and σ is the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. Given the
analysis focuses on primary energy use, ct is assumed to represent all
Fig. 1. Primary fossil fuel energy mix (relative shares).
2 In addition, technological change can increase the eﬃciency of the use of a primary
energy source, potentially changing the fuel mix toward the fuel that has experienced the
technology improvement. However, since there are technology diﬀusion ﬂows among
developed economies, technology should not play a major role in explaining diﬀerences
in the energy mix among countries.
3 The models were simulated using the software program DYNARE, a freely available
software platform at http://www.dynare.org/.
4 The focus of the paper is to assess the impact of international prices relative to energy
policy on the primary fossil fuel energy mix, so renewable and nuclear energy are not
taken into account. In the past, the deployment of energy from renewables and nuclear
has generally been the result of governmental strategy pursuing objectives such as energy
security, greenhouse emissions reduction, economic competitiveness, industrial devel-
opment or even green jobs (see Dassisti and Carnimeo (2012) for a discussion concerning
the European Union). Additionally, there are no ‘international prices’ for nuclear and
renewable energy; hence, it is not possible to include them in the analysis. We considered
the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) as a proxy for the international price of
renewable or nuclear technology; however, this was not deemed appropriate given that
the LCOE depends on factors such as leverage, the discount rate, taxes, cost of land,
(footnote continued)
administrative permissions, etc. Therefore, LCOE does not allow for a homogeneous
comparison.
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consumption. Therefore, the model does not distinguish between
consumption of energy by households and ﬁrms.5 The household
maximizes an intertemporal expected discounted ﬂow of utility subject
to the budget constraint and capital accumulation:
∑max E β c σ1 −c k t
t t
σ
, 0
=0
∞ 1−
t t+1
(2)
subject to:
c k μ k wn r k+ − (1− ) = +t t t t t t t+1 (3)
where, the variable kt is capital, rt is the interest rate, wt are wages and nt
is the quantity of labor, all at time t . The parameter β is the discount
factor and μ is the capital depreciation rate. The ﬁrst order conditions
that deﬁne optimal household behavior are:
U
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c k μ k wn r k+ − (1 − ) = +t t t t t t t+1 (5)
Eq. (4) is the Euler condition that governs the intertemporal
substitution of consumption and Eq. (5) represents the budget
constraint. In addition, the transversality condition for capital is:
lim U
c
k∂
∂
= 0t
t
t→∞
(6)
2.2. The representative ﬁrm
It is assumed that there is one competitive and representative ﬁrm
that produces ‘ﬁnal goods and services.’ The ﬁrm uses labor, capital,
and three primary fossil fuels as inputs according to a production
function with constant returns to scale. Moreover, the production
function is assumed to be a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
function for a composite fossil fuel source (consisting of natural gas
and coal), which is nested within a CES function with oil, which is
further nested within a Cobb-Douglas (CD) function with capital and
labor; as follows:
⎛
⎝⎜
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O
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γ δγ
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where Yt is ﬁnal output, nt is labor, kt is capital, eOt is oil, eGt is natural
gas, and eCt is coal at time t . The chosen speciﬁcation of technology is
similar to that used in Blazquez et al. (2017), but here it is assumed
that the elasticities of substitution between natural gas and coal and
between oil and the composite fossil fuel source (consisting of natural
gas and coal) are diﬀerent. This is because oil is generally reﬁned to
produce oil products that are heavily used in the transportation sector,
whereas the vast majority of coal and natural gas is used to produce
electricity and thus compete against each other as fuel sources for
power.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the ﬁnal goods ﬁrm to maximize
proﬁts are:
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where w r P P P, , , , andt t O G Ct t t are the prices of labor, capital, oil, natural
gas, and coal at time t . The price of the aggregate good is normalized to
one, so that all prices in the economy are real prices. The quantity of
labor is also normalized to one to simplify the analysis. Eqs. (8)–(12)
imply that input prices are equal to the respective marginal productiv-
ities.
2.3. Prices of fossil fuels
Fossil fuel prices are assumed to be exogenous and follow stochastic
processes:
lnP ρ lnP ρ lnP ε= (1− ) + + ,O O O
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O
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where POss, PGss and PCss represent the steady state values for the price of
oil, natural gas, and coal, respectively – around which each price
ﬂuctuates. The variables εtO, εtG and εtC represent innovations in the
stochastic processes. These variables are assumed to follow a normal
multivariate process:
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2.4. The competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium for this economy is a set of allocation
and price paths that satisfy the following conditions:
i) c k{ , }t t solve the household's problem given prices r w{ , }t t .
ii) n k e e e{ , , , , }t t O G Ct t t maximize the proﬁts of the ﬁrm that produces
the aggregate ‘good’ given input prices w r P P P{ , , , , }t t O G Ct t t .
iii) All markets clear.
In summary, the theoretical model above is characterized by:
• a representative household with rational expectations that max-
imizes consumption over time;
• a representative ﬁrm that produces ﬁnal goods and services with a
constant returns to scales production function and maximizes proﬁts
in a competitive environment; and
• exogenous stochastic fossil fuel prices.
This theoretical model is nonlinear and stochastic; hence, it is not
5 The model used here therefore diﬀers to that introduced by Dhawan and Jeske
(2008) (who distinguish between energy use by ﬁrms and consumers) and to that
introduced by Plante (2014) (who distinguishes between oil and oil products use by ﬁrms
and consumers, respectively). However, Dhawan and Jeske's (2008) model is used to
analyze energy price shocks on the macro economy and Plante's (2014) model is used to
analyze how monetary policy should respond to changes in oil prices. Therefore, given
the focus of the analysis in this paper (similar to Golosov et al. (2014)), it is assumed that
consumers maximize utility with respect to ct only in order to simplify the analysis.
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possible to obtain analytical solutions. Therefore, the model is solved
numerically and calibrated values for the parameters are required. The
sections below describe the calibration and econometric estimation for
the USA, Germany, and the UK.
3. The USA
3.1. USA model calibration
3.1.1. Final goods ﬁrm
The elasticity of substitution measures how factors of demand vary
as relative factor prices change. The assumptions about these elasti-
cities are vital for the calibration of the model introduced in Section 2
and the outcome of the analysis since they determine the shape and
behavior of the production function, Eq. (7). For the top-level relation-
ship between labor, capital, and the total composite fossil fuel a CD
technology is assumed; hence, the partial elasticity of substitution
between each pair of factors is unity. However, this is not the case for
the nested relationships between the diﬀerent fossil fuels, where a CES
technology is assumed. Thus, it is important to consider the assump-
tions for the interfuel elasticities of substitution that measure how fuel
demand varies as relative fuel prices change.
There is a long history of research attempting to estimate measures
of interfuel substitutability. This is summarized by Stern (2012) who
undertakes a meta-analysis using almost 50 primary studies that
include results for the USA, Germany, and the UK. However, although
Stern (2012) identiﬁes a number of key drivers that determine the
results for a range of interfuel elasticities, the paper does not supply
obvious values for the key interfuel elasticities of substitution required
for Eq. (7); namely, between natural gas and coal and between oil and
the composite fossil fuel (from natural gas and coal). Moreover, when
considering the individual studies included in Stern (2012), they were
found not to be applicable here.6 For example, many of the studies are
now dated (being from the 1970s) and often did not report the actual
estimated interfuel elasticities of substitution. Furthermore, primary
fossil fuels at the whole economy level are considered here and it would
appear that many of the previous studies used secondary energy
consumption at a sectoral level – again rendering them not appropriate
for our analysis.
Instead, therefore, the USA interfuel elasticities of substitution used
here are based on the estimates from Serletis et al. (2010). These
estimates were chosen given they are for the national level and use
annual data for the estimation (in line with the data frequency used in
the analysis here7). Therefore, the appropriate averages of the esti-
mated (asymmetric) Morishima elasticities of substitution from Table 6
of Serletis et al. (2010; p. 742) are used here. This gives, for the USA,
assumed interfuel elasticities of substitution of 0.38 for coal and
natural gas and 0.24 for oil and the composite fossil fuel (consisting
of natural gas and coal) – which implies that δ and γ in Eq. (7) are
equal to −3.16 and −1.65, respectively.
Given the δ and γ assumptions and using actual USA data8 for the
period 1980–2014, Eqs. (8)–(12) allow for the calibration of the
parameters α, ϕ, a, and b. For the key energy related parameters (a
and b) the averages for various sub-periods were considered to ensure
the stability of the calibrated values, which are given in Table 1; in
addition the annual ﬁgures for a and b are illustrated in Fig. 29 (along
with 1-b10). These show that over the whole period the calibrated
energy related parameters are relatively stable for the USA, with no
noticeable diﬀerence across time. Moreover, as shown in Table 1, the
coeﬃcient of variation for a is relatively small at 4% but it is slightly
larger for b at 11%. However, both a and b are regarded as being
relatively stable for the USA; hence, the average calibrated values from
the whole sample (1980–2014) are used when running the simulations
discussed below. Table 2 therefore gives all the USA calibrated
production function parameters averaged over the whole period,
derived from Eqs. (8)–(12).
3.1.2. The household
Following the meta-analysis of Havranek et al. (2015), we assume
an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5, implying that σ is
equal to 2. Using standard values from the macroeconomic literature
(see for example, Prescott, 1986), the parameter β is assumed to equal
0.96 and μ is assumed to equal 0.1.
3.1.3. Fossil fuel prices
Table 3 presents the correlation coeﬃcients between the real prices
of crude oil, natural gas, and coal. The price of coal is relatively strongly
correlated with the price of oil, but the correlation of the price of
natural gas with both oil and coal is less strong. This is consistent with
the view that in the USA, natural gas prices ‘decoupled’ from oil prices
following the emergence of shale gas (see Joskow (2015)), given that
for the period 1980–2006 the correlation between the oil price and
natural gas was 0.63 compared to 0.40 over the whole period.
Given the relatively strong correlations between prices, it would be
wrong to assume that the residuals of the stochastic processes given in
Eqs. (13)–(15) are independent. On the contrary, the high correlations
suggest that energy prices are aﬀected by the same shocks. Prices are
therefore modeled using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)
method, allowing the shocks on the three fossil fuel prices to be
contemporaneously correlated (see Green (2012)). Table 4 presents a
summary of the estimation results. Furthermore, Table 5 shows the
covariance matrix of the residuals from the estimated equations, which
imply that oil shocks, natural gas shocks, and coal shocks are not
independent in the model.
3.2. USA results
The calibrated parameters from above are applied in order to assess
the stability of the primary fossil fuel mix in the USA during the period
1980–2014. Fig. 3 compares the actual fossil fuel shares for oil, natural
gas, and coal with the predicted shares from the model simulation. The
results ‘predict’ the actual shares relatively well, including the impact of
large fossil fuel price ﬂuctuations. For example, from 2000 the price of
oil increased relative to the prices of natural gas and coal, which is
reﬂected in the results and the actual shares, both showing a sharp
increase in the share of natural gas and a decline in the share of oil in
the primary fossil fuel mix. However, a more stable evolution of coal's
share in the fossil fuel mix than actually occurred is predicted,
suggesting that coal should represent around 26% of the fossil fuel
mix during the period 1980–2014, which is not consistent with the
Table 1
USA calibrated energy related production function parameters (for different periods).
Period a b
1980–1990 0.89 0.62
1991–2000 0.84 0.63
2001–2010 0.87 0.67
2011–2014 0.91 0.71
Mean (1980–2014) 0.87 0.65
Standard deviation 0.03 0.07
Coeﬃcient of variation 0.04 0.11
6 See Table 1 in Stern (2012; pp. 309–314) for a full list of the previous studies.
7 Unlike Golosov et al. (2014) that used a 10-year data frequency in their analysis.
8 See the Appendix A for a detailed description of the data.
9 The range of the vertical axes for the USA charts are the same as those presented
below for Germany and the UK to aid comparison.
10 Note the discussion of the calibration focusses on the energy related parameters of
the production function a and b; however, the parameter 1-b is also shown in Fig. 2 (as
well as Figs. 4 and 5 below) to aid clarity.
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actual data for the period. The larger share of coal consumption during
those years probably reﬂects the response to the 1970s oil embargo,
when power generation in the USA switched from oil to coal for energy
security reasons (see EIA (2012)), rather than in response to a change
in the relative price of coal. In addition, the model does not pick up the
sharp decline in the share of coal since 2008 that may be due to the
implementation of new energy policies. According to the IEA/IRENA
(n.d.), 27 new policies on climate change entered into force in the USA
2009 and 2010 following President Obama's electoral pledge. However,
the evolution of the natural gas share is very well captured by the
model, suggesting that prices mostly explain the increase in natural gas
consumption since 2008 and the rise of its share in the primary fossil
fuel mix.
In summary, the model does a good job in explaining how the USA's
primary fossil fuel mix evolved over the period 1980–2014, suggesting
that relative fossil fuel prices generally dominated in determining the
USA's mix. The next section considers Germany and the UK, to analyze
whether such a model can explain the primary fossil fuel mix evolution
as successfully in countries where there has been more structural
change and where energy policy was more active.
4. Germany and the UK
4.1. Germany and the UK model calibration
4.1.1. Representative ﬁrm
Unlike for the USA, we could not ﬁnd any recent papers that
included appropriate interfuel elasticity of substitution estimates for
Germany and the UK. Therefore, for Germany and the UK the same
values as those used for the USA from Serletis et al. (2010) were
assumed for both European countries. This implicitly assumes that the
same energy-using technologies in the USA were available in Germany
Fig. 2. USA Calibrated energy related production function parameters.
Table 2
USA calibrated production function parameters (used for analysis).
Period α ϕ a b
1980–2014 0.60 0.34 0.87 0.65
Table 3
Real fossil fuel prices correlation coefficients for the USA (1980–2014).
Oil Natural Gas Coal
Oil 1 0.40 0.80
Natural Gas 1 0.59
Coal 1
Table 4
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for price models.
Coefficient Std. Error
ρO 0.86 0.07
ρG 0.71 0.10
ρC 0.68 0.12
Table 5
Covariance matrix for the errors.
εtO εtG εtC
εtO 0.05 0.02 0.02
εtG 0.07 0.02
εtC 0.04
Fig. 3. Actual and predicted USA primary fossil fuel energy shares.
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and the UK – which should not be an unreasonable assumption given
they are all western developed economies. Nonetheless, to ensure that
the results are robust, a sensitivity analysis around the assumptions for
the key interfuel elasticity of substitution was undertaken, and
although there are some small diﬀerences in the quantitative results,
there are no discernable diﬀerences in the qualitative results.11
Similar to the analysis for the USA, the stability of the calibrated
energy related parameters for Germany and the USA was investigated.
Therefore, the average calibrated parameters (a and b) for the two
European countries using Eqs. (8)–(12), over various sub-periods
within the period 1980–2014 are given in Table 6 (with summary
statistics) along with the annual ﬁgures for Germany and the UK
illustrated in Figs. 4 and5, respectively. Unlike for the USA, however,
the key calibrated energy related parameters for Germany and the UK
are relatively unstable over the period considered. Both calibrated
energy related parameters for both European countries show much
greater variation than for the USA. The coeﬃcients of variation for a
are 14% for Germany and 74% for the UK, both higher than the 4%
value for the USA. This is also the case for b, with coeﬃcients of
variation of 60% for Germany and 92% for the UK compared to 11% for
the USA. 12 These variations, highlighted by diﬀerences across the sub-
periods, likely reﬂect the change in energy structure that accompanied
German reuniﬁcation in 1990 and the liberalization of the UK energy
sector during the 1980s and the 1990s. In other words, structural
change and policy factors appear to dominate the impact of changing
relative prices.
It is interesting to consider the possible reasons for the greater
variability in the energy related calibrated parameters (a and b) for
Germany and UK than the USA. For Germany, b is found to be very
small during the 1980s, reﬂecting the relatively low consumption of
natural gas and oil and the importance of coal in the primary fossil fuel
mix – which is likely to be the outcome of policies implemented by both
East and West Germany during that period. In 1991, following German
reuniﬁcation, energy policy changed dramatically as the eastern part of
the country shifted towards a more market-oriented system. For the
UK, in the 1980s, the parameter b is found to be substantially smaller
than for the remainder of the period – which is likely to be due to the
(then publically owned) UK electricity industry having to buy and use
coal produced by the UK's (then publically owned) coal company.13
However, for the UK, b changed markedly from the early 1990s
following the government's liberalization and privatization policies,
when both the electricity and coal industries were re-structured and
sold to the private sector and the subsequent shift from coal- to gas-
ﬁred power production.14
In Germany, 1991–2002 was a period of transition. Coal progres-
sively lost market share relative to oil and natural gas. This transition
might have been explained by a systematic increase of coal prices
relative to natural gas prices; however, the actual path of relative prices
was the opposite. For the UK, 1991–1998 was a period of transition
and, as in Germany's transition period, the evolution of relative fossil
fuel prices was not consistent with the increase in natural gas
consumption. Thus, for these two European countries, changes in the
relative prices of natural gas, coal, or oil cannot explain the transition
from coal to natural gas. Lauber and Mez (2004) suggest that in
Germany a change in energy policy towards a more clean and
sustainable energy mix drove the transition toward natural gas. In
the UK, an institutional change drove the transition, as the electricity
system moved from a state controlled and eﬀectively vertically inte-
grated system to an unbundled, privatized, liberalized, and deregulated
market system (as discussed in Green (1991)).
Given this variability, when simulating the model for Germany, the
values for a and b are the averages for 2003–2014, since they are
relatively stable over this period. For the UK, the model is calibrated
using data for 1998–2014, given that a and b are relatively stable
through this period. Table 7 therefore presents all the calibrated
parameters for the production function parameters for both Germany
and the UK, derived from Eqs. (8)–(12).
4.1.2. Household
The parametrization of the households for Germany and the UK are
identical as the one used for the USA.
4.1.3. Fossil fuel prices
Table 8 presents the correlation coeﬃcients between the real prices
of crude oil, natural gas, and coal for Germany and the UK. The
correlation between the price of oil and the price of natural gas for both
Germany and the UK is much higher than that for the USA. No ‘shale
gas revolution’ has occurred in Europe, arguably the main reason
behind the decoupling of prices in the USA. In addition, the high
correlation could be caused by long-term natural gas contracts in
Europe that are linked to oil prices, as Stern (2009) points out.
Similarly, the correlation coeﬃcient between the price of natural gas
and the price of coal is about 0.8 for both Germany and the UK
compared to about 0.6 for the USA. Unlike in the USA, natural gas
prices in Germany and the UK do not appear to have ‘decoupled’ from
oil prices. Nonetheless, as in the USA, there is relatively strong
correlation between the fossil fuel prices in Germany and in the UK,
suggesting that the prices are aﬀected by the same shocks. Therefore,
models for the fossil fuel prices in Germany and the UK are also
estimated using the SUR method. Table 9 presents the main estimation
results for both European countries. Finally, Table 10 shows the
covariance matrix for the residuals of the regressions. As in the USA,
the results suggest that oil shocks, natural gas shocks, and coal shocks
are not independent.
4.2. Germany results
The results for Germany are generated for the whole period, but
using the calibrated parameters for the period 2003–2014, as ex-
plained above. Fig. 6 represents the actual German fossil fuel energy
mix for the whole period compared to that predicted by using the
Table 6
Germany and UK calibrated energy related production function parameters (for different
periods).
Germany UK
a b a b
1980–1990 0.66 0.10 0.80 0.34
1991–2000 0.86 0.35 0.73 0.70
2001–2010 0.86 0.58 0.59 0.93
2011–2014 0.89 0.59 0.74 0.92
1998–2014 0.67 0.93
2003–2014 0.86 0.59
Mean (1980–2014) 0.80 0.36 0.71 0.68
Standard deviation 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.27
Coeﬃcient of variance 0.14 0.60 0.74 0.92
11 The sensitivity analysis involved varying the German and British elasticity of
substitution assumptions by a half, both negatively and positively. Therefore, the natural
gas and coal elasticity of substitution of 0.38 was varied by ± 0.19 and the oil and
composite fossil fuel elasticity of substitution of 0.24 was varied by ± 0.12; thus, giving a
total of four comparator models to benchmark the central model against. The charts
illustrating the sensitivity analysis for both European countries (and for the USA that was
also undertaken for completeness) are available from the authors on request.
12 The implicit parameter (1-b, that represents coal) also displays greater variability
for Germany and the UK (as can be seen by comparing the ﬁnal right hand diagrams of
Figs. 4 and 5 with Fig. 2).
13 The public Central Electricity Generating Board was established in 1957, but was
restructured and privatized in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
14 See Green (1991) for an explanation and discussion about the impact of privatiza-
tion on the structure of the UK electricity market.
T. Atalla et al. Energy Policy 106 (2017) 536–546
541
calibrated parameters for 2003–2014. This predicts the fossil fuel mix
relatively well for the 2003–2014 period, suggesting that relative fuel
prices were the main driver of the fossil fuel mix during that time. In
particular, it captures the decline of the share of oil in the energy mix
after 2008 while the shares of gas and coal were relatively stable.
The price of fossil fuels appeared to predict adequately the USA's
primary fossil fuel mix for the whole period, suggesting that the role of
policy had a minor impact compared to the relative price drivers.
However, a very diﬀerent situation is observed for Germany. Fig. 6
illustrates the noticeable change in the German primary fossil fuel mix
from 1990 onwards, likely driven by energy policy and the structural
changes that followed German reuniﬁcation. This clearly highlights
that large shifts in energy policy accompanied by structural changes in
energy marginalize the role of fossil fuel prices in determining the fossil
fuel mix.
Given that the parameters for Germany are taken from a sub-period
of the data, alternative model parametrizations were also analyzed. The
reforms in Germany in the 1990s favored more liberalized markets,
implying that fossil fuel prices should have a higher impact on the
primary fossil fuel mix in the later part of the sample. In other words,
given that prices drive the model, it should adjust better in the later
part of the sample. The sample was therefore divided into three sub-
periods: 1980–1990, 1991–2002 (the transition period), and 2003–
2014. For each sub-period, we re-calibrated the energy related
production function parameters and compared the actual fossil fuel
mix with that predicted by using actual prices.
To compare the quality of the predictions, for each sub-period the
Fig. 4. Germany calibrated energy related production function parameters.
Fig. 5. UK calibrated energy related production function parameters.
Table 7
Germany and UK calibrated production function parameters (used for analysis).
Period α ϕ a b
Germany 2003–2014 0.63 0.35 0.86 0.59
UK 1998–2014 0.65 0.32 0.67 0.93
Table 8
Real fossil fuel prices correlation coefficients for Germany and the UK (1980–2014).
Germany UK
Oil Natural gas Coal Oil Natural gas Coal
Oil 1 0.87 0.80 1 0.85 0.76
Natural gas 1 0.83 1 0.78
Coal 1 1
Table 9
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for price models.
Germany UK
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient St. Error
ρO 0.75 0.07 0.80 0.07
ρG 0.81 0.01 0.76 0.09
ρC 0.58 0.12 0.65 0.10
Table 10
Covariance matrix for the errors.
Germany UK
εtO εtG εtC εtO εtG εtC
εtO 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02
εtG 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.04
εtC 0.05 0.04
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average of the sum of the quadratic diﬀerence between the shares
predicted and actual shares of the fossil fuel mix were calculated, i.e.,
the sum of quadratic prediction errors for each fuel share given by the
formula
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
Data Predicted
n
∑( − )2
. Table 11 shows that, as expected, the
smallest prediction errors occur for oil, natural gas, and coal for the
2003–2014 sub-period – suggesting that the predictions are more
accurate in this period. Although, in the case of oil these errors are
similar to those of the transition sub-period 1991–2002 and in the case
of natural gas these errors are similar to those of the ﬁrst sub-period
1980–1990.
4.3. UK results
For the UK, the results were generated over the whole period using
the calibrated parameters from 1998 to 2014, as discussed above and
are shown in Fig. 7. This predicts the share of oil reasonably well for
the whole period, but markedly over-predicts the gas share and under-
predicts the coal share up until the late 1990s. This result is not
surprising given that the nationalized coal and electricity industries in
the UK were re-structured, liberalized, and privatized, with the full
eﬀect coming through in the mid to late 1990s. Moreover, during the
publicly owned period and the initial few years of the privatized era,
power producers were contracted to use a certain amount of UK coal.
Unsurprisingly, the relative fossil fuel prices in the model over-predict
the gas share but under-predict the coal share during this time.
As soon as the privatized electricity sector was released from such
constraints in about the mid-1990s, the situation changed and relative
fuel prices appear to aﬀect the primary fossil fuel shares. From about
the mid-1990s, the share of coal fell and the share of natural gas rose,
reﬂecting the new Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) stations that
incumbent and new power producers built in the so-called ‘dash-for-
gas’.15 Therefore, as in Germany, the calibration replicates well primary
fossil fuel energy mix, when the parameters are stable. This result is
consistent with the periods when market forces, and hence relative
prices, drove the primary fossil fuel mix.
The UK model should perform well after the market-oriented
reforms took eﬀect. Therefore, as in Germany, diﬀerent model para-
metrizations were analyzed by dividing the sample into three sub-
periods: 1980–1990, 1991–1997 (the transition period) and 1998–
2014. Again, we re-calibrated the energy related parameters for the
production function for each sub-period to compare the actual fossil
fuel mix with that predicted. Table 12 shows that the prediction errors
for natural gas and coal are smaller in the 1998–2014 sub-period –
although for oil, the prediction errors are smallest during the transition
period – but overall the ﬁnal 1998–2014 sub-period produces the most
accurate UK results.
4.4. The economic results of the energy reforms in Germany and the
UK
Germany and the UK reformed and liberalized their energy systems
in the 1990s based on the premise that market-oriented economies
allow for greater competition, which should improve eﬃciency, lower
prices, increase ﬁnal consumption, and increase social welfare. As
already highlighted, these reforms resulted in a dramatic change in the
primary fossil fuel mix, with the share of natural gas increasing and the
share of coal decreasing while the share of oil remained more or less
stable. This change potentially exposed the two economies to more
volatile fossil fuel prices; in particular, more volatile natural gas prices
compared to coal prices. As discussed in the introduction, policymakers
perceive increased fuel price volatility as a risk (see, for example, the
discussion about the volatility of oil prices on the economy in Kantchev
(2015) and Klevnäs et al. (2015)). Nonetheless, how changes in the
primary fossil fuel mix aﬀect the vulnerability of the economic system
remains, to our knowledge, unexplored; therefore, we also examine this
question.
An initial approach to explore the impact of the primary fossil fuel
mix shift on the volatility of the German and British economies is by
analyzing the impulse-response functions associated with a shock to
each fossil fuel price on output. These are shown in Fig. 8 for the
parametrizations covering the 1980–1990 period for both countries,
2003–2014 for Germany, and 1998–2014 for the UK. This shows that
an oil price shock has a similar impact on output for both calibration
periods, pre and post-liberalization of electricity markets, and for both,
Germany and the UK. Nevertheless, the results for coal and natural gas
are diﬀerent depending on the period used for the calibration. In both
countries, Fig. 8 suggests that the macroeconomic impact of a coal
price shock has decreased given that the impulse responses are higher
for the 1980–1990 period calibrations compared to the shorter period.
In contrast, the macroeconomic impact of a natural gas price shock has
increased given that the impulse responses are lower for the 1980–
1990 period calibrations compared to the shorter period. Therefore, for
both countries it would appear that the liberalization of the energy
markets reduced the exposure to of their economies to coal disruptions
at the cost of greater exposure to natural gas disruptions.
However, this analysis does not reveal whether the shift in the fossil
Fig. 6. Actual and predicted German primary fossil fuel energy shares.
Table 11
Average of the sum of quadratic errors for Germany.
Oil Natural Gas Coal
Calibration 1980–1990 0.0007 0.0001 0.0005
Calibration 1991–2002 (transition period) 0.0002 0.0007 0.0011
Calibration 2003–2014 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003
15 Watson (1997) discusses the many factors that explain the fast uptake of CCGTs in
the 1990s.
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fuel mix created a more volatile economic environment. To do this the
volatility of private consumption and output for Germany and the UK
for both parametrizations are calculated and shown in Table 13. This
suggests that as a result of the changes in the primary fossil fuel mix
resulting from the reforms of the 1990s, private consumption is about
6% and 5% more volatile in Germany and the UK, respectively and
output about 4% more volatile.
The prices of oil and natural gas, at least in Europe, are strongly
correlated, as shown in Table 8 implying that oil price shocks are
directly translated into natural gas price shocks of similar magnitude.
Table 14 shows the coeﬃcient of variation of real fossil fuel prices for
both European countries, illustrating that coal is the least volatile fossil
fuel price. Given the higher volatility of natural gas prices relative to
coal, the reforms of the 1990s in both Germany and the UK and the
resulting changes in the primary fossil fuel supply mix appear to have
generated a more volatile economic environment. In summary, the
German and British energy transitions towards natural gas as a
consequence of a move to a more market orientated approach resulted
in a ‘cleaner’ energy mix, but at the cost of increased economic
volatility.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
The USA is one of the world's most market-driven economies. On
the other hand, the two European comparator countries, Germany and
the UK, have experienced signiﬁcant structural and energy policy
changes since the 1980s. The USA has experienced a relatively stable
fossil fuel mix since 1980, while in Germany and the UK, the share of
natural gas increased dramatically at the expense of coal. If market
forces dominated, then the observed change in the fossil fuel mix in
Germany and the UK would be consistent with an increase in the
relative price of coal compared to natural gas. However, historical fossil
fuel prices did not follow this trend, conﬁrming that energy policy
played an important role in the evolution of the fossil fuel mix in
Germany and the UK.
This paper therefore analyzes the drivers of the fossil fuel mix in the
USA and compares them to Germany and the UK, given the diﬀerent
evolution of the fossil fuel mix and the diﬀerent roles that prices and
policy have played in North America and Europe. To achieve this, a
DSGE model is calibrated and simulated to explore the impact of
relative prices on the primary fossil fuel mix over the period 1980–
2014. We then compared the results using a similar analysis for
Germany and the UK. In addition, the German and British models
are used to evaluate the volatility of private consumption and output
for the pre- and post-reform periods for both European countries to
assess how changes in the primary fossil fuel mix aﬀected these two
economies.
For the USA, it is found that the calibrated production function
explains well the evolution of the primary fossil fuel mix over the whole
period 1980–2014, suggesting that relative fossil fuel prices and the
market generally dominated the determination of the USA primary
fossil fuel mix over the period. However, a diﬀerent picture emerges for
Germany and the UK, where dramatically changing shares of natural
gas and coal cannot be explained by the calibrated production functions
over the whole period. Instead, the production function for Germany is
calibrated using data from the 2003–2014 period and for the UK using
data for the 1998–2014 period. For both Germany and the UK, the
calibrations perform well following the countries' transitional periods,
when the allocation of resources in the energy sector became more
market-oriented.16
Furthermore, given the dramatic increase in the shares of natural
gas in Germany and the UK, the impact on the two economies is
considered by analyzing the potential for increased volatility in private
consumption and output. This analysis shows that, given the greater
volatility of natural gas prices compared to coal prices, the move
toward natural gas has generated a more volatile economic environ-
ment in both Germany and the UK. The German and British energy
transitions towards natural gas have resulted in a ‘cleaner’ energy mix,
but at the cost of increased economic volatility.
The analysis in this paper not only sheds light on the drivers of the
primary fossil fuel mix, but also shows that the impact of natural gas
price shocks could potentially be as important as previous oil price
shocks. These issues, as far we know, have not been addressed
empirically in the literature, where the focus has been the impact of
oil price shocks on economic activity.
Finally, the past ‘energy transitions’ in both Germany and the UK
considered in this paper came about due to a combination of political
and structural changes. In Germany, the transition came about mainly
from the reuniﬁcation of the old East and West Germany and the
subsequent move away from the heavily centrally planned coal-ﬁred
power system. In the UK, the transition was driven by the 1980s
Thatcher government's agenda to reduce the role of the state and
increase eﬃciency by deregulating, liberalizing, and privatizing the
diﬀerent parts of the energy industry. Both transitions, however,
Table 12
Average of the sum of quadratic errors for the UK.
Oil Natural Gas Coal
Calibration 1980–1990 0.0013 0.0007 0.0014
Calibration 1991–1997 (transition period) 0.0000 0.0015 0.0015
Calibration 1998–2014 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002
Fig. 7. Actual and predicted UK primary fossil fuel energy shares.
16 It is worth noting that one factor that could play a role in the evolution of the mix of
fossil fuels in Germany and the UK is taxes given international prices are used in the
modeling. However, it would appear that there were no obvious structural changes in fuel
taxes in the two European countries that would have altered relative domestic fuel prices
enough in order to drive the change in the observed fossil fuel mix.
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resulted in de-regulated market driven energy systems where the fuel
mix was driven predominantly by market determined relative fuel
prices – more akin to that in the USA. Furthermore, although this
resulted in a ‘cleaner’ fuel mix – as the share of gas increased at the
expense of the share of replaced coal – neither transition was instigated
by the environmental agenda and the need to reduce carbon emissions.
However, Europe is now in a new ‘energy transition’ era given the
environmental constraint, with a move to increase signiﬁcantly the
proportion of renewables by introducing command and incentive
policies to bring about a diﬀerent energy mix to what would ensue if
left purely to the market. It will therefore be interesting to see the
impact this has and how the energy mix evolves over the next couple of
decades in Europe compared to that in the USA.
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Appendix A. Description of the data
The primary energy consumption data for the three fossil fuels (oil,
natural gas, and coal) for the three countries (the USA, Germany, and
the UK) were all obtained from BP (2016). Data for international oil
prices were also obtained from BP (2016), with the Brent used as the
representative price of crude oil for Germany and the UK and West
Texas Intermediate for the USA.
Coal prices were generated diﬀerently, with the Central Appalachian
coal spot price used as the reference coal price for the USA from 1980 to
2014. For Germany and the UK, for 1987–2014 the Northwest Europe
marker coal price was used as the representative coal price and for 1980–
1986 the sea-borne USA Central Appalachian coal spot price was used as a
reference for price movements in the two countries – assuming that both
series have similar annual rates of growth.
In the case of natural gas, for the USA the Henry Hub spot price for
the years 1987–2014 was used and the USA spot wellhead gas price
obtained from EIA (n.d.) for the preceding years. The average import
price were used as the German benchmark price for 1984–2014 and for
the preceding period 1980–1983, the German price was reverse-
Fig. 8. Output impulse response functions to primary fossil fuel price shocks.
Table 13
Standard deviation according to the Germany and the UK models.
Germany Private consumption Output
Calibration 1980–1990 0.0080 0.0157
Calibration 2003–2014 0.0085 0.0163
Percent Diﬀerence 6.3 3.8
UK Private consumption Output
Calibration 1980–1990 0.0079 0.0145
Calibration 1998–2014 0.0083 0.0151
Percent Diﬀerence 5.1 4.1
Table 14
Coefficient of variation of real fossil fuel prices.
Oil Natural gas Coal
Germany 0.53 0.46 0.30
UK 0.51 0.46 0.29
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constructed by assuming similar growth rates to the USA spot wellhead
gas price obtained from the EIA (n.d.). In the case of the UK, the
National Balancing Point (NBP) price for the period 1996–2014 was
used and for the preceding period 1980–1995, the UK gas price was
reverse-constructed by assuming similar growth rates to the German
gas prices.
All three fossil fuel prices were converted to real terms using
country-speciﬁc deﬂators. The USA, Germany, and the UK Gross
Domestic Products (GDPs), in both real and nominal terms, were
taken from World Bank (n.d.), complemented by data on the share of
labor as a percentage of GDP taken from the European Commission
database (AMECO n.d.).
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